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Indonesia-unique  among middle-income  oil-producing coun-
tries  - adjusted rapidly to oil price shocks, and it begins a new
decade  with good prospects for noninflationary growth and
better creditworthiness. What is the country's secret?
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Despite extcmal shocks, Indonesia has main-  Ahmed and Chhibber use an econometri-
tained creditworthiness through swift adjust-  cally estimated macroeconomic model to
ment.  analyze open-economv adjustment in Indonesia
--  particularly the interaction between the ex-
Indonesia's  flexible economic management  change rate, the interest rate, growth, and debt
and clear policy signals have Ient stability to the  --  and to analyze future policy changes in light
economy, in contrast to the stop-and-go reforms,  of Indonesia's objectives for growth, external
uncertainty, and constant debt renegotiations in  debt, and inflation.
many high-debt countries.
Indonesia's open capital account - domes-
The gains from this sLable  policy environ-  tic interest rates InusL  equal foreign interest rates
ment - in avoiding capital flignt, attracting  plus the expected rate of devaluation  - elimi-
productive foreign investment, and export diver-  nates one avenue for effecting intemal adjust-
sification  - far exceed the likely benefits of  ment.  But it lends discipline to the country's
contentious debt reduction negotiations currently  fiscal and monetary management.
under way in several highly indebted countries.
Unlike many oth_-r  developing nations,
Indonesia has focused on resolving its debt
problems by increasing exports.
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The  recent  focus  on debt  renegotiation  and  debt  reduction  schemes  has
shifted  attention  from  countries  such  as Indonesia  which,  despite  external
shocks,  have  maintained  creditworthiness  through  swift  ad3ustment.
Indonesia's  flexible  economic  management  and  clear  policy  signals  have
provided  a substantial  degree  of stability  to the  economy. Unlike  many  high-
debt  countries,  Indonesia  has concentrsted  on efforts  to resolve  its  debt
problems  through  efforts  to increase  exports. As a result,  it  has  avoided  the
costs  and  uncertainty  surrounding  the  stop-go  nature  of economic  policymaking
that  ha^  afflicted  most  high-debt  countries. Moreover,  despite  heavy
adjustment,  important  social  gains  were  achieved,  as reflected  in  a
substantial  reduction  in  the  i.ncidence  of poverty.  l/
A  major  factor  driving  the  future  adjustment  effort  is the  external
debt  situation.  A successful  debt strategy  for  Indonesia  will involve  both
running  some  surpluses  in  the  non-interest  current  account  (reducing  the
current  account  deficit)  and  enhancing  future  debt servicing  capacity  by
increasing  growth. However,  there  a:  ractical  limits  to the  extent  these
two  objectives  can  be reconciled.  The  attempt  to squeeze  too  large  a
non-interest  current  account  surplus  can,  in turn,  hurt  Indonesia  by
constraining  economic  growth  and  thereby  reducing  debt servicing  capacity  over
the  long  term. Lower  real  growth  will  also  adversely  affect  Indonesia's
ability  to  address  the  social  objectives  of raising  labor  earnings  and
/  The  percentage  of people  falling  below  the  designated  poverty  line  fell
from  57.1Z  in  1970  to  39.81  in 1980,  and  from  33% in 1984  to 22%  in 1987.- 2 -
reducing  poverty. How  the  current  account  deficit  gets  reduced  is  also
important. Real  exchange  rate  depreciation  results  in  real  income  losses  due
to  revaluation  of  past  debt.  The  important  policy  issue  now is  whether  the
real  exchange  rate  needs  to depreciate  further  or  will  lagged  response  to past
depreciations  and  efficiency  improvements  result  in sufficient  export  growth
as  well  as import  substitution.
The  external  adjustment  will  have  to be accompanied  by a
corresponding  internal  adjustmuent.  The  key  questions  here  are:  (a)  will the
required  internal  adjustment  lead  to  a low  level  of savings  and  investment;
(b)  what  will  be the  share  of this  adjustment  effort  borne  by the  public
versus  the  private  sector;  and (c)  most importantly,  how  much  of the
adjustment  will  be borne  by investment  versus  consumption.  Indonesia's  future
internal  adjustment  challenge  is  to substantially  raise  the  national  savings
rate.  The  public  sector  and,  until  recently,  the  private  sector  have  been
running  deficits,  as indicated  by  negative  net  savings. This  has  happened
even  though  public  and  private  investment  rates  have  fallen  noticeably,
implying  a sharp  reduction  in the  national  savings  rate. The  incidence  of
lower  income  resulting  from  terms  of trade  loss  and  reduced  pace  of growth  has
fallen  disproportionately  on savings  because  government  policy  supported  the
protection  of consumption.
In this  paper  we set  out  a framework  to address  these  issues
quantitatively.  To this  end,  we present  a macroeconomic  model  of the
Indonesian  economy  with  endogenous  determination  of the  real  exchange  rate  and
the  real  interest  rate.  The  paper  is  divided  into  six  sections. In Section  I
we present  a summary  description  of Indonesia's  recent  adjustment  efforts. In
Section  II  we discuss  the  analytics  of  open-economy  adjustment,  in particularthe  interaction  between  the  exchange  rate,  the  interest  rate,  growth  and
debt.  Indonesia's  open  capital  account  implies  that  domestic  interest  rates
must  equal  foreign  interest  rates  plus  the  expected  rate  of devaluation.  The
open  capital  account  therefore  reduces  one  degree  of freedom  available  to the
Indonesian  authorities  to effect  internal  adjustment.  On the  other  hand,  it
also  provides  discipline  to the  country's  fiscal  and  monetary  management  as
excessive  credit  creation  would  reduce  domestic  real  interest  rates  and induce
capital  outflows. The  implications  of the  open  capital  account  for
Indonesia's  adjustment  are  analysed  in this  section. Section  III  presents  the
-npirical  estimates  of the  macroeconomic  model. The  key  parameters  are the
interest  and  exchange  rate  sensitivity  of  private  consumption  and  investment
and  the  elasticity  of exports  and imports  to the  real  exchange  rate.
In Section  IV,  the  model  is  used  to illustrate  the  nature  of  external
adjustment  necessary  to ensure  the  consistency  of growth  with  external  balance
and the  implications  for  exchange  rate  management. Section  V then  examines
the  internal  adjustment  which  must  accompany  the  required  external  adjustment,
how  much  of it  occurs  in  the  public  versus  the  private  sector  and  the  role  of
fiscal  policy  in  effecting  this  adjustment.  The last  section  provides  the
conclusions.-4  -
I.  Recent  Adjustment  Efforts
The  main source  of external  problems  has  been  a severe  deterioration
in Indonesia's  terms  of trade,  primarily  due  to the  collapse  of oil
prices.  21  The  revenue  losses  from  falling  oil  prices  have  been  compounded  by
the  adve,se  effects  of international  currency  fluctuations  on  debt service
payments  since  mid-1985. The  Government  has  responded  to these  external
sbocks  by implementing  a broad  range  of adjustment  measures  and structural
policy  reforms. As a result,  the  macroeconomic  imbalances  have  been
significantly  reduced  while  economic  growth  has remained  positive  in  per
capita  terms. Although  some  short-term  social  costs  have  been incurred,
Indonesia's  long-term  growth  prospects  would  undoubtedly  have  been severely
jeopardized  and  debt  accumulation  would  have  accelerated  faster  if  these
necessary  adjustments  had  not  been  implemented.
During  1983-88,  Indonesia's  external  and  fiscal  imbalances  were
significartly  reduced,  inflation  was  contained  at below  10%  and  economic
growth  remained  positive  in  per  capita  terms  (see  Tables  1  and  2).  Moreover,
Indonesia  was  able  to  reduce  reliance  on oil  earnings  31  and improve  economic
efficiency.  A range  of austere  macroeconomic  policies  and structural  reforms
contributed  to this  performance.  The  exchange  rate  was  devalued  resulting  in
a real  exchange  rate  depreciation  of 55%  between  December  1981  and  December
1988. Major  devaluations  were implemented  in  March  1983  and  September  1986
and  the  flexibility  of the  exchange  rate  was increased  through  a  more  accively
managed  float. Strong  fiscal  measures  designed  to restrain  expenditure  and
2/  See  Brian  Pinto  (1987),  Alan  Gelb (1988),  and  Sadiq  Ahmed  (1989).
31  In  current  dollars,  the  share  of non-oil  exports  in total  exports
increased  from  21%  in  1982/83  to 61%  in 1988/89.-5-
Table  1:  MEASURES  OF THE OVERALL  DEBT BURDEN
(Z)
1980  1981  1982  194'  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Indonesia
Medium  and  long  term  18.1  19.9  23.0  26.8  26.9  31.6  37.6  46.8  47.5
debt  (US$  billion)
Debt/GNP  25.2  22.3  25.2  34.9  33.5  39.2  51.9  71.0  64.7
Debt/exports  80.5  79.5  115.9  127.6  123.8  158.9  247.7  236.8  220.8
Current  account
balance/GNP  3.4  -3.0  -7.9  -5.8  -2.8  -2.4  -5.9  -2.3  -2.5
Non-interest  current
account  balance/CNP  5.0  -1.3  -6.0  -3.2  0.5  0.7  -1.9  2.3  2.1
Countries  with  recent
debt-servicing  problems
Debt/GDP  32.5  37.6  43.7  47.6  47.6  49.1  51.3  53.9
Debt/exports  151.5 186.1 240.9 254.6 246.3 266.8 309.5  313.4
Current  account
balance/GDP  -3.6  -5.9  -5.5  -2.0  -0.9  -0.5  -1.8  -1.5
Non-interest  current
account  balance/GDP  -0.5  -1.7  -0.5  2.8  4.1  4.2  2.5  2.6
Note:  Countries  with  recent  debt-servicing  problems  are  defined  as  those  which  incurred
external  payment  arrears  in  1985  or  rescehduled  their  debt  during  the  period  from
end-1983  to  end-1986.
Source: Bank  Indonesia;  World  Economic  Outlook  (IMP),  October  1987;  IBRD-6-
Tabl  2:  RECENT  ECONOMIC  INDICATORS  */
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
X of  CGP
Total  Consumption  7'.1  76.5  77.3  76.6  76.8  81.3  79.2  78.8
Private  59.6  64.5  65.7  65.4  64.0  69.0  67.9  68.0
Public  1;.5  12.0  11.6  11.2  12.8  12.3  11.3  10.8
Total  investment  30.8  30.3  29.3  27.1  25.6  24.5  24.2  23.8
Fixed  investment  25.1  26.8  27.2  23.9  22.0  21.6  21.0  21.5
Private  b/  14.0  13.6  14.0  13.0  10.8  12.0  11.3  11.6
Public  11.1  13.2  13.2  10.9  11.2  9.6  9.7  9.9
Current  account  balance  -3.0  -8.0  -5.8  -2.8  -2.4  -5.0  -2.3  -2.5
Imports  of  goods  and  NPS  25.7  24.8  26.3  22.6  20.9  20.7  25.0  24.9
Exports  of  goods  and  NPS  26.1  20.8  26.5  25.9  23.7  19.9  28.8  28.3
Fiscal  balance  -2.0  -4.9  -2.8  0.6  -3.3  -4.6  -3.4  -3.4
Non-oil  GDP  growth  (X)  8.3  4.2  3.8  4.5  3.8  3.9  4.6  5.6
CPI inflation  (X)  16.7  8.6  11.8  10.5  4.7  5.8  9.5  8.5
Terms  of  trade  index  165.3 161.5 147.4 148.0 138.2  92.8  106.0  103.4
(1974  - 100)
Exchange  rate  (Rupiah/US$)  631.8 661.4 909.3  1025.9  1110.6  1282.6 1644.0 1696.0
a/  National  accoants  are  on  a  calendar  year  basis;  balance  of  payments
and  fiscal  data  are  on  a fiscal  year  basis.
_/  Investment  in  stocks  is  assumed  to  be financed  by the  private  sector.
Source: Ministry  of  Finance,  Bank  of  Indonesia  and  World  Bank  staff
estimates.-7-
mobilize  public  resources  were introduced.  As a result,  non-oil  taxes  as a
percentage  of non-oil  GDP  grew from  8.3Z  in 1982/83  to 11.51  in 1988/89  and
the  overall  public  sector  deficit  declined  from  4.91  of GDP  in 1982/83  to 3.41
of CDP  in 1988/89. Supportive  monetary  and  financial  policies  were  put in
place  to contain  inflationary  pressures,  prevent  capital  flight,  mobilize
financial  resources  and  improve  the  efficiency  of use  of financial
resources.  A major  reform  in  June 1983  deregulated  domestic  interest  rates.
Subsequently,  further  measures  to  promote  competition  in the  financial  sector
and  boost  capital  markets  were introduced  in  October-December  1988. Important
steps  were  also  taken  to deregulate  the  real  sector  of the  economy. Through  a
series  of  measures  during  1985-88,  non-tariff  trade  barriers  were  considerably
eased,  nominal  tariffs  were  reduced  and investment  regulations  for  domestic
and  foreign  enterprises  were  simplified.
Despite  good  external  adjustment  performance  and  the  Government's
cautious  approach  to  external  borrowing,  the  debt  burden  has  risen  sharply
since  the  early  1980s. Many  of the  debt  indicators  for  Indonesia  are  also
above  the  average  for  all  developing  countries  and in  line  with those  for
countries  with  "recent  debt-servicing  problems".  These  indicators  reflect  the
adverse  external  environment  faced  by  Indonesia  since  the  early  1980s.
Depreciation  of the  US dollar  after  1985  added  US312.6  billion  (31X)  to
Indonesia's  public  debt  at end-1988  and  US$1.9  billion  (251)  to its  debt
servicing  during  1988.  Over  the  same  period,  oil  prices  fell  by  about  one
half,  severely  reducing  Indonesia's  export  earnings. However,  even  with  the
rise  in  debt indicators,  it  is  important  to distinguish  Indonesia  from  tCs
countries  with  recent  debt-servicing  problems  in several  important  respects:
(a)  it  has  maint%ined  sound  economic  policies  and  a prudent  borrowingstrategy;  41 (b)  as  a result,  it receives  strong  financial  support  from
official  sources  on concessionAl  terms;  (c)  it  has substantial  resorves
available  in the  form  of foreign  exchange  and  undrawn  lines  of credit;  and (d)
it  has  retained  access  to new  voluntary  lending  from  commercial  banks.
Moreover,  Indonesia's  debt  structure  is  better  than  in  most  developing
countries,  with  a  relatively  high  share  of concessional  debt  and  a relatively
low  share  of variable  interest  debt.
Although  the  past  achievements  are  impressive,  Indonesia  faces  many
important  challenges  for  the  future. Civen  the  existing  high  debt service
burden  '1 and  uncertainties  surrounding  oil  prices,  the  adjustment  effort  will
need  to  continue  in the  short  term. One  of the  central  objectives  of
Indonesia's  macroeconomic  policy  is to  reduce  its  debt service  and  debt  GNP
ratios. On the  other  hand,  the  social  objectives  of providing  higher-earning
jobs  to  a growing  labor  force  and  reducing  the  incidence  of poverty  have
become  more  pressing. In  order  to  ensure  that  the  pursuit  of social
objectives  does  not compromise  financial  stability,  the  consistency  of
macroeconomic  policies  will  have  to  be  maintained  and  the  ongoing  structural
reform  program  will  need to  be strengthened.
Higher  oil  prices  will  no doubt  help Indonesia's  external  position
and  reduce  debt  accumulation.  A significant  and  additional  key  factor  that
will  help  reconcile  the  current  account  adjusts.  't  with enhanced  debt  service
capacity  is the  growth  of non-oil  exports. The  better  the  non-oil  export
41  The  Government  has  maintained  strict  limits  on import-related  and
commercial  credits,  and  reduced  exposure  to  private  banks.
5/  The  medium  and  long  term (MLT)  debt  service  ratio  in 1988  was  36X.-9-
performance,  the  greater  the  success  in  achieving  a reduction  in the  current
account  deficit. Moreover,  hib'ier  non-oil  exports  will  directly  increase  the
current  debt service  capacity;  this  in turn  will  also  improve  long-term  debt
serv  ce capacity  by enabling  a faster  growth  of GDP.  Therefore,  the  future
external  adjustment  strategy  will  have  to rely  mainly  on non-oil  export
promotion.  There  is  already  a  recognition  of this  in  the  Government's  recent
policy  framework. Thus,  trade  deregulation  since  1986  is a reflection  of the
Govervment's  strategy  to  move  away  from  inefficient  import  substitution.
Also,  the  combination  of a competitive  exchange  rate  and  trade  reforms  has
already  boosted  non-oil  exports  during  1986-89.
Until  recently,  the  adjustment  was  borne  largely  through  cuts  in
investment  (Figure  1).  Note  that,  despite  substantial  swings  in income,  both
public  and  private  consumption  have  grown  smoothly  (Figure  2).  While
sustained  improvements  in  economic  efficiency  through  deregulatory  reforms  and
rationalization  of public  expenditure  programs  will  benefit  growth,  continued
reduction  in investment  will  lower  growth  over  the  medium  term. The  question
for  the  future  is  whether  the  required  adjustment  should  continue  to come  from
investment  or should  it  come  from  increased  resource  mobilization.
One  way to increase  savings  is through  increased  resource
mobilization  in the  public  sector. The  Government's  resource  mobilization
efforts  and  a recovery  of economic  growth  since  1987  have  helped  raise  the
national  saving  rate,  despite  higher  external  interest  payments. Given  lower
oil  earnings,  a much  greater  reliance  on efficiency  improvements  will  be
essential  to sustain  the  growth  momentum  in  the 1990s  than  in  the  past. Even
so,  continued  efforts  will  be  necessary  to increase  the  savings  rate,  so  as
to:  (a)  offset  the  effect  of  a lower  rate  of foreign  savings  (lower  current- 10  -
account  deficit);  and  (b)  finance  a  significant  increase  in  the  investment
rate  to  support  higher  economic  growth  over  the  medium  term. The  need  to
effect  adjustment  without  a  cut  in  investment  is  a  key  adjustment  challenge
for  the  1990s.- 11 -
Figure  1.
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II.  Real  Exchange  Rates,  Real  Interest  Rates  and  Growth: The  Analytics  61
The two  key  prices  underlying  macroeconomic  management  are  the  real
exchange  rate  and the  real  interest  rate.  In  an economy  with  open  capital
account  there  are restrictions  on the  relationship  between  the  two:
r =  rf  n
The  real  interest  rate  (r)  is  equal  to the  real  foreign  interest  rate  plus  the
expected  rate  of depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  (n ).
The  real  exchange  rate is  the  price  at which  foreign  goods  are  traded
for  home  goods. The  real  interest  rate  is the  price  at which  current  goods
are  traded  for  future  goods. An increase  in the  real  interest  rate (r)  will
raise  private  savings  (Sp)  and  lower  private  investment  (Ip)  (this  is verified
empirically  later). An increase  in  r therefore  allows  a country  to run  a
higher  fiscal  deficit  (FD)  for  the  same  level  of the  external  deficit  (CAS).
This  can  be seen  from  the  following  identity.
CAS =  Sp(r) - Ip(r) - FD
With  an  open  capital  account,  the  domestic  interest  (r)  cannot  differ
from  the  foreign  interest  rate (rf)  unless  the  exchange  rate  deviates  from  its
equilibrium  value. If the  real  exchange  rate  is lower  (i.e.,  it is
appreciated)  than  its  equilibrium  value,  then  the  expectation  is that  it  will
rise (depreciate:  ;>O ).  As a result,  for  any  given  foreign  interest  rate,
the  domestic  interest  rate  (r)  will rise,  bringing  about  the  required
adjustment.  As long  as the  exchange  rate  is  not  allowed  to  depreciate,  real
61  The  framework  is similar  to one  used  on Mexico;  see  Sweder  van  Wijnbergen
(1989). We get  somewhat  different  results  and  conclusions.- 14  -
domestic  interest  rates  will remain  above  foreign  interest  rates. Over time,
as the  exchange  rate  depreciates,  the  domestic  interest  rate  will fall  towards
the  foreign  interest  rate (rf). How long  this  adjustment  process  lasts
depends  very  much  on how  long  the  exchange  rate  adjustment  gets  delayed.
In Figure  3, in the  n-r  space,  we show  the  equilibrium  in the
external  account  (measured  by the  current  account  deficit)  and  the  goods
market. The  ED curve  shows  the  combination  of the  real interest  rate  (r)  and
the  real  exchange  rate  (n )  which  will  maintain  a certain  level  of current
account  deficit. As the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates  n>O  ,  exports  rise  and
imports  fall  (these  are  verified  econometrically  in the  next  section)  and  the
external  surplus  rises. To restore  balance,  r  will  have to fall  so that
private  consumption  and investment  rise  (again  the  next section  verifies  the
interest  sensitivity  of private  consumption  and  investment)  resulting  in  an
increase  in imports  and  a fall  in  exports. The  ED curve  therefore  has  a
negative  slope.
The  DD curve  shows  the  combination  of r  and n  which  will  maintain  a
given  level  of output. An increase  in the  interest  rate  leads  to  a decline  in
both  consumption  and  investment  demand,  leading  to  excess  supply.  The
exchange  rate  would  have  to  depreciate  (n>O  )  to restore  equilibrium.  An
exchange  rate  depreciation  wil: increase  demand  for  home  country  goods  by
foreigners.  The  DD curve  slopes  upwards.
Let  us now  see  what  happens  when the  economy  faces  an adverse  terms
of trade  shock,  as Indonesia  has  since  1982. The  DD  curve  shifts  outwards  to
DD'  (Figure  3, Quadrant  II)  - the  economy  either  needs  a  higher  interest  rate
or a  more  depreciated  exchange  rate  or  a combination  of the  two  to restore
domestic  equilibrium.  At the  new  equilibrium,  the  real  exchange  rate  nj is- 15  -
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depreciated,  whereas  the  real  interest  rate  remains  the  same  as the  foreign
interest  rate.  71  If the  real  exchange  rate  remains  unchanged,  i.e.,  the
government  does  not  devalue  the  nominal  rate,  then  domestic  interest  rates
must  rise  or the  government  must  run  a higher  current  account  deficit  and
finance  it  by borrowing  abroad  or  depleting  reserves.
The  speed  and  trajectory  of movement  from  a to a'  depends  on the
government's  policy  responses. If the  exchange  rate  is flexible  and  the
capital  account  is open,  the  movement  from  a to a' is rapid  and  along  the
horizontal  rf line  rightwards.  Slow  domestic  price  -esponse  would  hasten  the
adjustment  because  the  nominal  exchange  rate  depreciation  would  quickly
translate  into  a  real  exchange  rate  adjustment. If the  exchange  rate  is
fixed,  the  nature  of adjustment  would  depend  on  how  quickly  the  government
adjusts  the  nominal  rate.  Initially,  if the  nominal  rate  remains  fixed,  the
-.  al  exchange  rate  might  actually  appreciate.  This  would  happen  if  the  terms
of trade  shock  leads  to  a  higher  fiscal  deficit  as oil  revenues  fall  but
expenditures  are  difficult  to  cut.  This  leads  to higher  inflation  and
exchange  rate  appreciation.
As the  DD curve  shifts  to the  right,  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  is
now  n  instead  of n.  With  a fixed  exchange  rate,  there  is  now  an expectation
of  a real  depreciation.  As a result,  domestic  real  interest  rates  rise  and
private  investment  and  growth  suffer. Unless  real  interest  rates  rise
to r"'',  the  current  account  deficit  will increase  and  the  economy  will  have
to  accumulate  foreign  debt.  Moreover,  domestic  interest  rates  lower  than
71 We assume  for  simplification  that  the  foreign  interest  rate  (rf)  remains
constant. Typically,  lending  to  a low-income  country  would  have  a risk
premium  so  that  even  in  equilibrium  r could  deviate  from  rf.- 17  -
foreign  interest  rates  plus  expected  depreciation  will lead  to an outflow  of
capital  and  a loss  of reserves. If the  government  devalues  but  the  resutting
depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate is insufficient  say  from  n  to n ,  the
adjustment  path  goes  initially  from  a to  a".  Real  interest  rates  still  rise
but  now  only  to r".  How  long  the  government  delays  adjustment  from  n to n
determines  the  extent  of debt  accumulation  during  the  adjustment  phase.
The  restoration  of output  and interest  rates  to the  previous  level  is
not costless  as it requires  a fall  in  consumption  or in investment,  resulting
in a lower  standard  of living  for  the  population.  There  are  two  alternatives
to this  type  of adjustment.  The  first  involves  greater  debt  accumulation,
assuming  foreigners  are  willing  to finance  larger  external  deficits. The
second  is to  combine  devaluation  with  policies  to bring  about  efficiency
improvements  so  that  the  incremental  capital  output  ratio  (ICOR)  falls  and the
economy  generates  higher  output  for  a lower  level  of investment.  This is
represented  by a shift  in the  output  function  outwards  in  Quadrant  1.
Changes  in  efficiency  of resource  use  are  not  easy  to bring  about  and
often  require  changes  in  real  prices  in the  economy  such  as in the  real
exchange  rate  and  the  real  wage. Nevertheless,  the  degree  of macroeconomic
adjustment  necessary  to  restore  equilibrium  can  be reduced  if  efficiency
improvements  take  place. An important  point  to note  is that  under  the  new
equilibrium  the  real  interest  rate  returns  to the  old  level  unless  the  foreign
interest  rate  changes  in the  meantime. The  real  exchange  rate  is  however
depreciated  under  the  new  equilibrium  a' in  comparison  to  the  old
equilibrium  a.  Unless  foreigners  are  willing  to finance  the  external  deficit
perpetually,  the  adjustment  to the  new equilibrium  is inevitable.  Delays  in
adjusting  will  however  lead  to higher  debt  and  a fall  in  output  growth,- 18  -
jeopardizing  creditworthiness,  The  movement  from  a to  a' can  be slow  and
painful  or smooth  and  quick. These  are  the  choices  faced  by  policy  makers.
Under  the  new  equilibrium,  real  wage3  are  also  lower,  declining  from
W/p  to  W/p  (Quadrant  III). In  Quadrant  IV,  we show  the  equilibrium  in the
labor  market. Ths  LL schedule  shows  the  combination  of real  wages  and output
that  will  generate  the  volume  of labor  demand  for  each  specified  labor
participation  rate. Under  the  new  equilibrium  with  lower  real  wages,  the
labor  participation  rate  rises,  leading  to  reduced  unemployment.
Has  Indonesia's  real  exchange  rate  adjustment  been  sufficient  to
bring  the  economy  from  n to n1'?  Are trade  reforms  and  domestic  deregulation
leading  to shifts  in the  output  curve  in  Figure  1 sufficient  to  avoid  the  need
for  further  real  exchange  rate  adjustment?  We come  back  to these  issues  in
Section  IV.  Before  that  we need  to  get  empirical  estiDates  of the  central
behavioral  relationships  in  Indonesia  - private  consumption,  private
investment,  exports,  imports  and  inflation.  We turn  to  these  in the  next
section.- 19  -
III. Empirical  Estimates  of the  Model
Domestic  Demand
Domestic  demand  (DD)  is  composed  of private  fixed  investment  (IP),
private  consumption  (CP),  public  fixed  investment  (IG),  public  consumption
(CC)  and  stock  changes  (AS).
D =  IP +  CP +  IG +  CG +  AS
Public  investment  and  public  consumption  are  considered  policy  variables;
stock  chai.es  are  considered  as exogenous  to the  model. There  is  a strong
relationship  between  public  expenditure  and  oil  revenues,  as one  would
expect. However,  Indonesia  used its  oil  revenues  flexibly,  thereby
facilitating  the  coordination  of  monetary  and fiscal  policies  in support  of
economic  development.  Thus,  during  the  oil  boom  period  (1978-81),  the
Government  accumulated  large  oil  surpluses  which  in turn  allowed  the  expansion
of  domestic  liquidity  for  private  activities,  without  creating  major
inflationary  pressures. Subsequently,  when  oil  prices  plummeted,  the
Government  was  able  to  drawdown  a part  of this  surplus  to finance  expenditure
and  avoid  severe  recession. The  other  components  of aggregate  demand  are
treated  as endogenous  variables. In the  rest  of this  section,  the  equations
determining  these  variables  are  derived  from  theory  and  are  estimated  using
Indonesian  time-series  data  for  the  period  1973-87.
Real  Non-Oil  Private  Investment  (IP)  8/
The  investment  equation  is  derived  from  a capital  stock  adjustment
model. The  desired  capital  stock  (K*)  is  a function  of expected  demand  (ye),
8/  Detailed  work  on Indonesian  investment  is  based  on Chhibber  and  Shafik
(1989).- 20  -
the  rental  cost  of  capital  (rL)  and the  real  cost  of imported  inputs. The
real  cost  of imported  inputs  (mc)  incorporates  the  effect  of the  exchange  rate
and  therefore  allows  for  the  negative  short  run  impact  of  a devaluation  on the
desired  capital  stock. The  negative  short-run  effect  of  mc on K* is  due  to
the  higher  real  cost  of imported  capital  goods  which  are  not  easily
substitutable  at home  and the  higher  real  cost  of intermediate  goods  required
for  production,  reducing  the  incentive  to  invest.
Kp*  =  f(rL,  mct  Ye)
which  can  be specified  in linear  form  as
Kp*  = a  +  al ye  + a2rL +  a 3mc
where  a, >  0,  a2  <  °  a3 C 0
In steady  state  a, = K/Y,  the  average  capital  output  ratio  of the
private  sector.
The  capital  stock  adjusts  to its  desired  level  with  an adjustment
lag  X,  which  takes  a value  between  0 and  1.
KPt  - KPtl  =  X[KPt*  - KPt- 1]
The  change  in  the  capital  stock  is  equal  to  gross  fixed  investment
(IPt)  less  the  depreciation  in last  year's  capital  stock
KPt  - KPt_  P  - d  KP  ee-l
6  is the  depreciation  rate.
Substituting  (3)  and (5)  into  (4)  gives  us
t  ao 1 X.Y  +  a2 )r +  a3 m  +  (-X+6)  KP  . .. (6)- 21  -
We use  lagged  total  CDP (y_,.)  as a proxy  for  expected  demand  21.  The
interest  rate  (rL)  is  defined  as (1+iL)/(1,yDEFe)-1,  where  iL  is the  nominal
lending  rate  and  yDEFe  is  the  expected  change  in the  GDP  deflator.  10Ž  The
real  cost  of imported  and intermediate  capital  goods  is  expected  to  have  a
negative  impact  on real  private  investment.  As separate  import  price  indices
were  not  available  for  consumer  goods  and intermediate  and  capital  goods,  the
overall  non-oil  goods  import  price  index  (MPI)  deflated  by the  GDP  deflator
was  used  as a proxy  for  mc.  Since  consumer  goods  make  up only  about  15%  of
total  non-oil  imports,  movements  in  the  MPI  are  a good  proxy  for  the  imported
costs  of production.  The  private  capital  stock  is  generated  by the  perpetual
inventory  method  described  by Equation  (5),  using  an estimate  of the  private
capital  stock  in 1972  and  a depreciation  rate  of 5%.  The  estimated  private
sector  investment  function  [Equation  (6)]  gave  the  following  results:
Ip = 3.0341  +  0.5137  yl  - 1 -34307 rL
(2.41)  (5.62)  (3.59)
-0.0038  m_-  -0.2109  KP_ 1
(3.87)  (3.06)  K2
R2=  0.94
D.W.  2.64
TSLS  instruments:  Lagged  GDP,  Singapore  interest  rate,  Lagged  private
capital  stock,  terms  of trade,  public  investment,  lagge.  real  import  costs.
The  variables  all  have  the  right  sign  and  are  statistically
significant.  The  most  notable  result  is  the  strong  negative  relationship
21  This  can  be justified  as a simple  version  of the  adaptive  expectations
hypothesis.  See  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1987).
0/ The  expected  GDP  deflator  is  the  predicted  value  of the  GDP  deflator  with
lagged  changes  in the  GDP  deflator  for  3 years  and  lagged  changes  in rice
prices  as the  predictor.- 22  -
between  interest  rate  and  private  investment.  From  this  equation  we can
derive  the  structural  coefficients  which  are:
A  =  0.26,  a, = 1.97,  a2 =  -13.20,  a3 =  -0.0146.
The  adjustment  of capital  stock  to its  desired  level  is slow,  taking
about  4 years  (1/X). The  long  run  semi-log  elasticity  of investment  to real
interest  rate  is  -7.3. This implies  that  a 1X  point  increase  in the  real
interest  rate  reduces  private  investment  by 7.3  percent.
The investment  equation  can  also  be specified  in log-form  if the
relationship  between  capital  and  output  is  presumed  to be  quadratic. In  this
case  the  desired  capital  stock  can  be  written  as
KPt*  =  Aoyeal.ea2rL.ea3mc
a, >  0, a2 <  0,  a 3 <  0
We now specify  the  adjustment  to the  desired  capital  stock  in logs
(ln  KPt  - ln  KPt_d)  =  Xfln  KP*  - ln  KPt_.]  .. i(8)
Substituting  7 into  8 gives  us
ln  KP  =  XlnAo  + Aa  lnye  + Xa rL  +  ianMc  (I-X)  in  KP  (9)
t  ~~~1 t2  L  3  -1t-1
This  equation  gave  the  following  result  for  the  real  private  capital
stock,  with lagged  output  used  as a proxy  for  expected  output.
ln KP  =  -0.3536  +  -0.4360  ln y_ 1 -0.1790  rL
(3.71)  (5.47)  (3.42)
-0.00019  mc_1  + 0.7148  ln  KP_
(3.80)  (12.74)
R2  =  0.999
D.W.  =  2.32
TSLS  instruments:  Lagged  log  GDP,  Singapore  interest  rates,  terms  of
trade  index,  lagged  log  Private  Capital  Stock,  public  investment,  lagged
real  import  costs.- 23 -
This  equation  corroborates  the  linear  equation  estimated  above. The
effect  of real interest  rates  on the  growth  of capital  (investment)  is
significantly  negative.
Private  Consumption
Private  consumption  (CP)  is  specified  as a function  of permanent
disposable  income  (yP)  temporary  disposable  income  (yT)  and the  real  interest
rate (r). Under  the  strict  version  of the  permanent  income  hypothesis,  the
coefficient  on permanent  income  should  be  one  and  on temporary  income  zero.
Here  we relax  these  assumptions  and  allow  for  a positive  consumption
propensity  out  of temporary  income. We follow  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1987)  by
assuming  that  permanent  disposable  income  is  related  to  current  and  lagged
disposable  income.
Cp  =  co  +  clyP  +  c2yT  +  c3r  ... (10)
yP  =  "yd  +  (1-  *)yd-1  .... (11)
and yT  =  Yd  - y  ... (12)
Substituting  (11)  into  (12)  we get:
yT  =  (1-  0)  [yd +  Yd-11  ... (13)
Substituting  (11)  and (13)  into  (10)  gives  the  following  reduced  form
equation:
Cp =  a+  a, yd +  a2 Yd-1  3  ...  (14)
where
a1 3  c1 l  +  c2(1-  9),
a2 =  (1-  0) (cl  +  c2) and- 24 -
Disposable  income  is  defined  as
Yd  =  GDP  - NT +  NPFI  - PERE
where
NT  =  Net  taxes  (Total  tax  revenue-transfers  and  subsidies)
NPFI  = Net  private  factor  income  from  abroad
PERE  =  Public  enterprise  retained  earnings
The  estimated  equation  is:
Cp =  0.0162  +  0 4891yd  + 0 2687yd'




D.W.  =  1.70
TSLS instruments:  Lagged  disposable  income,  lagged  investment  rate,  terms
of tradet  Singapore  interest  rate,  real  public  investment.
The interest  rate  relevant  for  consumption  and  savings  decisions  in
Indonesia  is  the  real  interest  rate  in  the  Singapore  market  (rf). The
domestic  deposit  rate  only  determines  where  savings  will  be  held in  the
short-run. Prior  to the  financial  sector  reform  of June  1983,  domestic
interest  rates  in  Indonesia  were regulated. Recognizing  the  unsustainability
of this  situation  in  an open  capital  account  economy,  the  Government
substantially  decontrolled  interest  rates  through  the  June  1983  reforms.
Since  then,  the  domestic  rate  has  generally  moved  in  line  with  the  Singapore
deposit  rate  plus  the  expected  rate  of real  depreciation.  111  In the  annual
model  here,  which  includes  periods  of regulated  and  deregulated  domestic
interest  rates,  the  Singapore  rate  is  used  because  money  can  move  freely
11/  For  supporting  evidence  based  on a quarterly  model,  see  Ahmed  and  Kapur
(1989).- 25 -
between  Indonesia  and  Singapore  and  the  marginal  savings  decision  is  based  on
changes  in  the  Singapore  rate.  Both  private  consumption  and  disposable  income
are  deflated  by the  domestic  CPI.
From  the  estimated  equation,  it is  not  possible  to determine  the
precise  values  of the  structural  coefficients.  Note,  however,  that  cl  =  b, +
b2  =  0.8578. This  is the  long-run  propensity  to consume  out  of permanent
disposable  income. This implies  that  the  steady-state  private  savings  rate in
Indonesia  is  around  14  - 15  percent. It is  not  possible  to determine  the
individual  value  of a  and  c2. However,  c2 <  cl as predicted  by theory  as long
as ba  >  0.  This  means  that  the  propensity  to  consume  out  of permanent  income
is  greater  than  the  propensity  to consume  out  of temporary  income. An
important  feature  of the  results  is  the  significant  negative  interest
elasticity  of private  consumption.  These  results  corroborate  the  findings  of
Boskin  (1978)  and  Gylafson  (1983)  for  the  U.S.  and  Anand,  Chhibber
and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  for  Turkey  which  show  a  negative  (positive)  effect
of interest  rates  on consumption  (savings).
The  same  equation  estimated  with  private  consumption  and  disposable
income  in logs  gave  the  following  fit:
LC  =  -0.2353  + 0.6389  LYd  + 0.3118  LYd-.
P  (7.17)  (5.26)  (2.62)
-0.019 3rf  12
(6.23)  0.997
D.W.=  2.11
TSLS  instruments:  Lagged  disposable  income,  lagged  investment  rate,  terms
of trade,  Singapore  interest  rate,  real  public  investment.
This  equation  shows  that  a 1  percent  point  increase  in  the  real
interest  rate  in the  Singapore  market  reduces  private  consumption  in Indonesia
by 1.93Z.- 26 -
These  results  do not  hold  up when  we substitute  the  real  interest
rate  on deposits  in  Indonesia  (ri). The  overall  fit  of the  equations  is
reduced  and  the  real  interest  rate  term  has  the  wrong  sign  and  is
statistically  insignificant.  The  estimated  equations  are  as follows.
Cp =  0.0107  +  0.2768  Yd  +  0.4530  Yd-I  +  0.0354  ri
(1.33)  (1.26)  (1.83)  (1.28)
R2  =  0.98
D.V.  - 1.18
TSLS instruments:  Nominal  Interest  Rate  in Sinjapore,  Lagged  Investment
Rate,  Terms  of  Trade,  Real  Public  Investment.
And  with  private  consumption  and  disposable  income  in logs  we get  the
following  equation.
LCp  =  -0.4503  + 0.4588  LYd  + 0.4255  LYd-1  + 0.3984  ri
(4.33)  (1.78)  (1.50)  (1.83)
&2  =  0.99
D.W.  =  1.49
TSLS instruments:  Nominal  Interest  Rate  in Singapore,  Lagged  Investment
Rate,  Terms  of  Tcade,  Log  of Real  Public  Investment.
The  reasons  for  the  differences  are  apparent  from  trends  in  private
consumption,  the  real  interest  rate  on deposits  in  Singapore  and the  real
interest  rate  on  deposits  in  Indonesia. Since  1983  the  private  savings  rate
has been  falling  in Indonesia  despite  a rise  in  real  domestic  interest
rates. Part  of the  fall  in savings  is  due  to the  fall  in income  resulting
from  declining  oil  prices. According  to our  model,  as temporary  income  has
declined  private  consumption  has  not  declined  as much. Moreover,  the  real
Singapore  interest  rate  which  drives  consumption  behavior  has fallen  relative
to the  domestic  real  rate (Figure  4).  The  domestic  real  interest  rate  has
been  rising  despite  a fall  in the  Singapore  real  rate.  This  puzzle  is
explained  by consumers'  expectations  on the  real  exchange  rate. In an economy- 27  -
Figure  4.
Real  Interest  Rates  in  IndonLesia  axId  Singapore
1978-  198-*
10  Indonesia
io~  2  Lo^  /  \
'  jtf  ~~~~~~~Singapore
-15-5
78t  79@  {:0  8  82D  833  84.  :85  8#;  87  83t- 28  -
with  an open  capital  account,  domestic  real  interest  rates  are  approximately
equal  to the  foreign  real interest  rate  plus  the  expected  change  in the  real
exchange  rate.
ri =  rf +  n  ... (15)
Ahmed  and  Kapur  (1988)  have  analysed  this  arbitrage  condition  for
Indonesia  in  a recent  paper. Using  quarterly  data,  they  show  that  the
difference  between  the  Singapore  deposit  rate  and  the  Indonesia  deposit  rate
can  be explained  by variables  which  measure  the  expected  rate  of depreciation
of the  Indonesia  rupiah.
Imports
Imports  are  broken  into  two  categories:  oil (M1))  and  non-oil
(MNO). Oil imports  are  treated  as exogenous  to the  model. Non-oil  imports
depend  on income  growth  and  the  real  exchange  rate  (n)
ln MNO  =  b0 +  b1(lnYn)  +  b2(lnn)  ... (16)
where  b1 >0,  b2<0.
The  equation  when  estimated  yielded  the  following  results.
ln  MNO  =  2.5128  +  1.0884  (lnYn)  - 0.7726  ln(n)
(4.21)  (7.83)  (4.67)  2
R=  0.81
D.W.  =  0.87
TSLS  instruments:  Lagged  investment  rate,  lagged  non-oil  imports,
terms  of trade  index,  population  growth.
The  estimated  elasticity  of non-oil  imports  to  output  growth  is 1.
Changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  have  a negative  effect  on import  growth  with
an elasticity  of -0.77.- 29 -
Exports
Exports  arp  classified  into  three  categories:  (i)  oil; (i:)  non-oil
manufactured  (XNOM);  and (iii)  non-oil  non-manufactured  (XNNM)  or traditional
exports.
Oil exports  are treated  as exogenous  in  the  model  as they  are  a
function  of complex  pricing  rules,  OPEC  quotas  and  world  demand. Non-oil
manufactured  exports  (XNOM)  are  constrained  by domestic  manufacturing  capacity
measured  by value  added  in  manufacturing  (GDPM). Indinesia's  manufactured
exports  constitute  a very small  (0.3%)  share  of  world  trade  in  manufactured
goods  so  that  world  demand  is  unlikely  to  be a constraining  factor  for  the
present,  although  it  may become  important  in  the  future. The  real  exchange
rate  also  enters  the  equation  as a price  variable,  as it  affects  the
competitiveness  of Indonesian  manufactures  with  respect  to  other  competing
exporters  given  world  manufactured  prices.  12/
ln (XNOM)  = -0.4117  +  1.0021 ln (  n )  +  2.6067  In (GDPM)
(0.19)  (2.00)  (7.97)
R2  =  G.95
D.W.  =  1.37
The  linear  equation  gave  the  following  results.
XNOM  =  -900.93  + 6.6539  n  + 367.4626  (GDPM)
(5.85)  (2.71)  (3.29)  2
t  =  0.86
D.W.  =  0.70
TSLS instruments:  Lagged  manufactured  exports,  lagged  terms  of trade,
lagged  value  added  in  manufacturing,  world  demand.
2/  For  the  quantitative  evidence  on the  important  role  of exchange  rate
policy  on exports,  see  Balassa  (1985). For  a review  of past  export
performance  of  East  Asian  countries  and  the  role  of exchange  rate  and
other  policies,  see  Bhattacharya  and  Linn  (1988).- 30 -
The  elasticity  of  manufactured  exports  with  respect  to the  real
exchange  rate is  close  to  one.  The  coefficient  on manufactured  capacity  is
high--over  2.  This  is because  manufactured  export  growth  rates  have  been  very
high,  increasing  rapidly  from  a very small  base.  In  a developing  country,
manufactured  exports  typically  follow  an S-shape  curve,  rising  slowly
initially,  then  expanding  very  rapidly  and  eventually  slowing  down.
Indonesia's  manufactured  exports  currently  appear  to  be in the  steeply  rising
segment  of the  S-curve. The  elasticity  of expcrts  with  respect  to  capacity
output  therefore  is  likely  to  decline  in  the  future.
Non-manufactured  non-oil  exports  (XNNM)  are  assumed  to be  a function
of real  world  demand  (Yw)  and  the  real  exchange  rate  (n).  In the  case  of non-
manufactured  non-oil  exports,  primarily  traditional  agriculture-based  exports,
the  main constraint  is  likely  to  be world  demand  because  of Indonesia's
significant  share  in the  world  market  for  many of these  commodities.  The  real
exchange  rate  is  used  as a price  variable  in this  equation  also,  unlike
standard  export  demand  functions  where  the  real  international  export  price  is
used. This is  done  for  uniformity  with  the  rest  of  the  model  and  to get  an
estimate  of the  effect  of a change  in the  real  exchange  rate  on traditional
exports. A dummy  variable  (DLGB)  is introduced  after  1981  to  capture  the
impact  of the  ban  on log  exports.
ln XNNM =  -0.1693 + 0.2198 (ln n)  +  1.5399 (ln Yw)
(0.16)  (2.07)  (5.14)
-0.3617  (DLGB)
(7.47)  12
D.W.  =  0.86
D.W. = 2.46- 31  -
The  linear  version  of this  equation  gave  the  following  result.
XNNM= -1453.94  +  3.8093  n  +  38.0359  Yw
(2.25)  (1.83)  (5.70)
-830.62  DLGB
(8.16)  R2  =0.89
D.W. =  2.65
TSLS instruments:  Lagged  manufactured  exports,  lagged  terms  of trade,
lagged  value  added  in  manufacturing,  world  demand.
The  elasticity  of  non-manufactured  exports  with respect  to the  real
exchange  rate  is  a little  over  0.2  and  with  respect  to  world  income  around
1.5.  Both  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  The  dummy  variable
representing  the  ban  on log  exports  is  also  highly  significant.
Non-Oil  Output  Growth
The  total  fixed  investment  rate  (lagged)  determines  non-oil  output
growth  (gy). This includes  both  public  and  private  investment.  A dummy
variable  (DY)  is  entered  after  1982  to account  for  a permanent  decline  in  the
growth  rate  of the  non-oil  economy  from  an average  of  8Z p.a.  during  1973-81
compared  to 3.9Z  p.a.  during  1982-87.  This  is  obviously  related  to the
decline  in  oil  revenues  leading  to adjustment  and  a slowdown  in  growth. The
estimated  equation  yielded  the  following  results.
gy =  0.3130 (I/y)-l  - 0.0355  DY
(13.76)  (4.33)  12
R2=  0.58
D.W. =  1.46
OLS.
Note  that  the  incremental  non-oil  capital-output  ratio  (ICOR)  is the
inverse  of the  coefficient  on (I/y)_.. The  average  non-oil  ICOR  during
1973-1981  is  therefore  3.1  rising  to  an average  of 3.5  during  1982-87.- 32  -
A major  question  arises  as to  how  we  model  efficiency  changes  arising
from  the  structural  changes  and  real  exchange  rate  adjustments  that  are
underway  in  Indonesia. The  ICOR  is traditionally  used  as a crude  indicator  of
efficiency  changes. The  above  equation  tells  us what  the  average  ICOR  has
risen  during  1982-87. However,  a further  breakdown  of the  ICOR  shows  that
much  of the  rise  happened  in 1982-85,  as slowdown  in  demand  reduced  capacity
utilization.  Since  1985,  responding  to structural  reforms,  the  ICOR  has  been
falling. Estimates  of total  factor  productivity  change  also  support  the
hypothesis  of efficiency  improvements  since  1985  (see  Ahmed  (1989)).
One important  variable  which  is  targetted  for  improving  the
efficiency  of capital  and foreign  exchange  use  is the  real  exchange  rate.
Therefore,  we introduce  the  real  ezchange  rate  as  an efficiency  variable  in
the  output  growth  equation  and  get  the  following  results.
gy  =  0.1767  (I/y)_ -0.0552  DY +  0.00042  n
(4.23)  (8.36)  (3.81)  _2
R  - 0.82
D.W.  =  1.90
OLIS.
This  equation  shows  that,  controlling  for  the  investment  rate  and the
permanent  terms  of  trade  shock  to  the  economy  in  1982,  growth  is  enhanced  by
depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.  More  realistic  exchange  rate  policy
has enhanced  growth  by moving  resources  from  relatively  inefficient  capital
intensive  activities  to  export-oriented  and  less  capital  intensive
industries.  We come  back  to this  issue  in Section  V.- 33  -
Inflation  13/
A key  variable  linking  the  exchange  rate  to the  interest  rate  in
Indonesia  is the  rate  of domestic  inflation. Thus  a  high  rate  of domestic
inflation  (due  to high  fiscal  deficits  or excessive  credit  expansion)  relative
to  world  inflation  will create  expectations  of an exchange  rate  depreciation
and  fuel  capital  flight. This  in  turn  will tend  to increase  the  domestic
interest  rate  to  restore  external  balance. Inflation  as  measured  by the
consumer  price  index  (CPI)  is  considered  a  weighted  average  of inflation  in
traded  goods  not subject  to  mark-ups  (pl)  and  other  commodities  (P 2). 141
°p  = XL  (°p)  (1-X)  (P2  ... (17)
Inflation  in  goods  not subject  to  markups  is  equal  to the  change  in
foreign  prices  plus  the  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  (Chhibber  et al
(1989)).
pl  =  Pf + e  ... (18)
For  goods  with  trade  restrictions  and  non-tradeables,  prices  are
0
determined  through  a  mark-up  over  unit  labor  costs  (wp) and  the  cost  of
imported  inputs  (mc)  (Bruno  (1979)  and  Corbo  (1985)).
The  degree  of  mark-up  will  depend  upon  demand  pressures  in the
economy  (ED)  and inflationary  expectations  (  0
P2=  a  +  a2mc  a 3 (ED, e)  ... (19)
3/ A deLailed  specification  of the  inflation  model,  with  alternative
specifications  and  implications  is available  in  Chhibber  (1989).
14/  The  inflation  model  used  here  is a variant  of the  inflation  model
developed  for  a study  on Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  is  presented  in Chhibber
et.al  (1989).- 34 -
Following  Corbo,  the  change  in the  cost  of imported  inputs  is assumed
to  equal  foreign  inflation  in  domestic  prices,  as in the  case  of p1 above.
mc  =  Pf +  e  ... (20)
The  change  in  unit  labor  costs  is  primarily  a function  of lagged  rice
prices. We follow  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1988)  in  specifying  monetary
0
growth  (M2)  as an indicator  of inflationary  expectations.  Excess  demand  in
turn  is specified  as  a function  of two  variables--the  rate  of capacity
utilization  and the  fiscal  deficit  as a share  of GNP (DEFY). The  rate  of
capacity  utilization  is  defined  as the  ratio  of capacity  output  and  actual
output. The  former  is  assumed  to  be a fixed  function  of the  capital  stock
which  is  measured  by the  perpetual  inventory  method,  as  described  in
Equation  5.
CU  =  I.K/y  ... (21)
where  I is the  average  output-capital  ratio
ln CU =  lnl  +  1nK-1nY  ... (22)
Substituting  Equations  16,  17,  18,  20 into  15  gives
p  =  A(pf+8)  +  (1-A)  (a P 1 + a2(Pf  +)
0
+  a3 (b 1 M2 + b2 DEFY  + b31nl  + b3 (lnK-lnY)J  ... (23)
C0 + C 1 (  e8)  + C  + C  +  C4 DEFY
+  C5 [lnK-lnY]  ... (24)
where  C1 =  +  (-X)a2 > 0;
C2 a1(l  A) >  0;
C3 a3bI > 0;
C4 =  a3b2 >  0;
C5 a3b3  < 0.- 35  -
The  estimation  of Equation  24  yielded  the  following  results:
0  0  0
p - 0.0226  + 0.2345  (e+°pf)  +  0.3392  (Pr-1)
(0.47)  (3.81)  (4.62)
0
+  0.3946  M42  +  0.0152  DEFY  - 0.2173  [lnK-1nYJ
(3.82)  (4.26)  (2.98)  R2 _ 0.91
D.W.  =  1.93
TSLS instruments:  Lagged  rice  price  inflation,  lagged  investment  rate,
lagged  non-oil  GDP, terms  of trade  index,  fiscal  deficit/GNP  and  M2
growth.
All  variables  have the  expected  signs  and  are  statistically
significant.  Both  cost-push  and  demand-pull  factors  have  contributed  to
inflation  in Indonesia.  The  ability  to restrain  the  pace  of inflation  in
recent  years,  despite  substantial  cost-push  pressures  emerging  from  two  large
discreet  devaluations  (by  28X in  March  1983  and  by 312  in  September,  1986)  has
been  possible  because  of austere  budgetary  policies  and  relatively  cautious
monetary  management  pursued  by the  Government  of Indonesia.
The  estimated  equation  is stable. Under  steady  state  general
inflation  (p),  depreciation  (e),  monetary  growth  (i 2), and inflation  in  rice
prices  (Pr  which  is  a proxy  for  nominal  wage  growth,  would  be  equal. The
equation  is stable  if the  coefficients  on e, M2 and  pr(.l)add  up to  unity.
This  is confirmed  by the  estimated  coefficients  whose  sum  is 0.97.- 36  -
IV.  Growth  of Debt  and the  Real  Exchange  Rate
At the  macroeconomic  level,  Indonesia's  fundamental  medium-term
imperative  is  to absorb  the  large  increment  to the  labor  force  (about  2-3
million  people  p.a.)  at  higher  le-els  of productivity  at the  same  time  that
the  debt  service  burden  is reduced  to a  more  manageable  'evel. The
Government's  target  is to achieve  a growth  rate  of the  non-oil  economy  by at
least  6% p.a.  over  the  next  five  years  (1989-94)  in  order  to  meet  the
employment  challenge.  The  Government  also  aims  at reducing  the  debt  service
burden  substantially.  The reconcilation  of the  growth  and the  debt  targets  in
turn  defines  sustainable  levels  of current  account  deficits.
The  real  exchange  rate,  as we have  seen  in Section  II,  is  a key  price
variable  in the  adjustment  process. Its  importance  for  Indonesia's  external
adjustment  is  amply  demonstrated  by the  empirical  estimates  of the  export  and
import  equations  presented  in Section  III. We saw  there  that  the  magnitude  of
the  export  and  import  elasticities  to  a change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  was
large. The  results  showed  that  the  non-oil  trade  balance  would  improve  by
over 1X  for  every  percentage  depreciation  in the  real  exchange  rate.
Indonesia  has  already  undergone  substantial  depreciation  in the  real
exchange  rate. For  example,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  depreciated  by
about  55X  between  December  1981  and  December  1988. An important  issue  is
whether  Indonesia  needs  further  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  to reconcile
its  external  objectives  with  growth. One  obvious  way  to  meet  the  external
targets  is  to reduce  growth. With slower  growth,  imports  are  expected  to
fall.  Exports  may  or may  not fall  depending  on the  compos;tion  of  output  cuts
and  accompanying  demand  management  policies. In the  case  of Indonesia,- 37  -
empirical  evidence  presented  above  shows  that  manufactured  exports  are
constrained  by  manufactured  output  growth. Therefore,  if  a cut in  output
growth  falls  heavily  on manufactures  the  loss  in  exports  may  be high  and  may
even  exceed  the  reduction  in imports. In this  situation  reduced  growth  may
not  necessarily  improve  external  targets.
Increases  in oroductivity  can  also  help  to  meet  growth  targets
without  a substantially  larger  external  deficit. With productivity
improvements  less  reliance  has  to be placed  on real  exchange  rate  depreciation
to maintain  profits  in the  export  industries.  Similarly,  the import  intensity
of production  can  be reduced. Productivity  improvements,  however,  take  time
to  have  an impact  and  are likely  to work  best  when  combined  with  an
appropriate  exchange  rate  policy. In general,  changes  in  the  real  exchange
rate  provide  the  quickest  way  to achieve  external  targets.
How  much  further  real  exchange  rate  adjustment  is  necessary  to
achieve  external  targets  in Indonesia?  Alternatively,  can  Indonesia's
external  and  growth  targets  be  met  without  further  real  exchange  rate
depreciation?  In order  to  answer  this  we first  attempt  to get  an estimate  of
the  likely  impact  of changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  on tn^  current
account. We develop  a reduced-form  model  to  estimate  the  determinants  of the
current  account,  which  uses  the  export  and import  functions  presented  in the
previous  section.
Current  Account  and  the  Real  Exchange  Rate
In order  to  get  an estimate  of the  likely  impact  of the  real  exchange
rate  on the  current  account  the  following  equation  for  the  current  account  is
derived  as a reduced  form,  using  the  export  and  import  equations.  The  overall- 38  -
export  equation  (the  sum  of oil  exports,  non-oil  manufacturing  and  non-oil
other  exports)  can  be written  as:
IXNOM  +  XNNM  H  XOIL  =  a0 +  a1 Yw  +  a2 Yn + a  3n +  XOIL  ... (25)
Imports  can  be specified  as:
MNOIL  +  MOIL - 10  + bI  Yn +  b2n +  MOIL  ... (26)
Subtracting  (2)  from  (1)
X-  (a 0 o-b 0) * aIYw  e (a 2-b1)Yn  +  (a 3-b2)Yi  + XOIL-MOIL ... (27)
The  left  hand side  can  be transformed  into
IPm  I  O  -)  a1Yw  + (a2-b1)Yn + (a3b 2)n + (X-Mgil+  NPI ... (28)
where  CA is the  current  account  surplus  and  NFI is  net  factor  income  from
abroad,  and  X  -P  - 1  is  the  income  terms  of trade  (TOTy).
Therefore  the  current  account  equation  can  be  written  as:
CA - C0+C1ToTy  +  C2 in +  C3Yw +  C4Yn +  C5(X-M)  oil+  NFI  ... (29)
c1>0  C2>0  C3>0,  C4<0 if lb 21  >  a2,  C5>O
Note  that  the  sign  of  Yn will  be positive  if the  elasticity  of
imports  is  greater  than  the  elasticity  of exports  with  respect  to income. The
sign  of  Yw will  be  unambiguously  negative  because  higher  world  income  leads  to
higher  exports. The  sign  of the  terms  of trade  variable  (TOTy)  is
unambiguously  positive.
In the  estimation  it  was found  that  there  was  high  collinearity
between  terms  of trade  changes  and  net  oil  ernorts. The latter  was  dropped
from  the  equation. Terms  of trade  changer  are largely  due  to oil  price
fluctuations.  The  reduced-fcrm  current  account  equation  performs  remarkably
well,  with  highly  significant  coefficients.- 39  -
The  equation  for  the  current  account  gave  the  following  results  and
follows  the  predicted  theory  very  well.
CA  - -60.7131  + 0.1193  ToT  + 0.9495  (Yw)
(4.11)  (5.44)  (3.51)
-4.4151  (Yn)  +  0.1163  (n)  -2
(5.44)  (2.65)  R  = 0.81
D.W.  =  1.32
TSLS  instruments:  Terms  of  trade  index,  world  income,  lagged  investment
rate,  popuLation  growth  rate,  lagged  real  exchange  rate,  lagged  non-oil
CDP.
In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  fiscal  deficit  on  the  current
account  deficit  we  distinguish  between  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  nominal
exchange  rate  and  the  fiscal  deficit.  The  fiscal  deficit  has  a  direct  and
indirect  effect  on  the  current  account.  The  direct  effect  is  the  impact  of
higher  expenditures  on  imports  financed  directly  by  government  borrowing.  The
indirect  effect  comes  from  the  impact  of  a  higher  fiscal  deficit  on  inflation
(this  was  verified  empirically  in  Section  III),  and  leads  to  an  appreciation
in  the  real  exchange  rate. The  latter  in  turn,  as  shown  by  our  empirically
verified  equations,  leads  to  higher  imports  and  lower  exports  and  therefore  a
higher  current  account  deficit.  Accordingly,  we  enter  the  nominal  exchange
rate  and  the  fiscal  deficit  as  a  share  of  GNP  (DEFY)  separately  in  the  current
account  equation.
CA  =  -37.6308  + 0.1104  TOT  +  0.7337  (Yw)
(2.50)  (3.47)  (3.00)
-4.2184  (Yn)  +  0.0121  (e)  + 0.4566  (DEFY)
(4.59)  (3.53)  (2.01)
R2  - 0.87
D.W.  - 1.54
OLS- 40 -
The  results  show  that  the  current  account  deficit  increases  by about
half  a percent  for  every  1%  increase  in  the  fiscal  deficit. This  can  be
avoided  by a  nominal  devaluation  but  the  combined  effect  of  a higher  fiscal
deficit  and  exchange  rate  depreciation  is,  ceteris  paribus,  higher  inflation
in the  economy. This  issue  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next section
where  the  combined  model  is  used  to look  into  the  question  of trade-offs
between  debt,  inflation  and  output  growth.
Would  Indonesia  Need Further  Real  Exchange  Rate  Depreciation?
We now  turn  to the  question  whether  Indonesia  would  need further
depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  iu  order  to  meet  external  targets. The
projected  current  account  targets  are  based  on reducing  the  public  sector  debt
service  ratio  by 10  percentage  points  by the  year  1993;  a stated  objective  of
the  Indonesian  authorities.
Figure  5 presents  the  target  current  account  deficit  as  a percentage
of GNP  necessary  to  meet the  external  debt  target. Using  Equation  29
estimated  in the  previous  section  and  given  domestic  output  growth  and  world
demand  growth,  we derive  the  required  real  exchange  rate  depreciation
(Figure  5)  necessary  to  meet the  target  current  account  levels. The
corresponding  debt/CNP  ratios  are  also  presented  in  Figure  5.  Note  that  for
the  moment  we are  assuming  output  growth  rates  as exogenous. This  requires  a
certain  level  of investment  and  gains  in  economic  efficiency.  Whether  the
internal  adjustment  necessary  to ensure  the  required  domestic  savings  and
investment  rate  is  compatible  with  this  growth  rate  will  be taken  up in  the
next section. Here  we assume  that  the  fiscal  policy  package  necessary  to
ensure  this  is  in place.- 41 -
We could  also invert  Equation  29  and  estimate  a real  exchange  rate
equation. This  gives  the  following  results.
n  =  423.11  - 0.9086  TOT  +  31.6469  Yn - 6.4465  Yw
(2.10)  (3.50)  (2.52)  (1.86)
+  7.3784  CAGNP
(3.07)
rt2  =  0.80
D.W.  =  1.27
TSLS  instriments:  Terms  of trade  index,  lagged  investment  rate,  lagged
real  exchange  rate index,  world  income,  population  growth  and  lagged  non-
oil  GDP.
This  equation  indicates  the  relationship  between  the  real  exchange
rate  and  the  current  account  deficit  for  a given  level  of terms  of trade,
world  income  growth  and  domestic  non-oil  growth. A larger  current  account
deficit  leads  to  a greater  appreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  as one  would
expect. According  to this  equation,  a 1X  point  increase  in  the  current
account  deficit  leads  to a decline  in  the  real  exchange  rate  index
(appreciation)  by 7.4  points.
Note  also that  the  coefficient  on the  terms  of trade  index  (TOT)  is
not  significantly  different  from  unity. A terms  of trade  improvement  by 10X
therefore  leads  to  a real  exchange  rate  appreciation  of 10%,  ceterus  paribus.-42-
Figure  5.
Indonesia: External Adjustment to 1995
(Alternate Scenarios)
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Using  the  estimated  real  exchange  rate  equation,  for  the  "base  case"
current  account  target  (e.g.,  the  current  account  deficit  falling  .rom  3.0X  of
GNP in 1987/88  to 1.0%  of CNP  by 1991/92),  the  real  exchange  rate  remains
roughly  constant  upto  the  year 1995  at the  projected  domestic  non-oil  growth
rate  of about  6% p.a.,  world  output  growth  of  about  3% p.a.  and terms  of trade
improvement  of about  19%  during  1989-95. Under  this  scenario,  the  debt/GNP
ratio  declines  from  over 70%  in 1987  to about  55%  by 1995.
Three  factors  account  for  Indonesia's  ability  to adjust  iithout
further  changes  in the  real  exchange  rate. The  first  element  is  the  very
laage  real  exchange  rate  adjustment  Indonesia  has  undergone  since  1982. The
second  factor  is the  improvement  in  the  terms  of trade  due to  recovery  in the
price  of oil  and  the  third  is continued  world  income  growth  at the  rate  of 3%
per  annum.
Under  these  assumptions,  Indonesia's  external  position  appears  fairly
comfortable. In fact,  even  if Indonesia  runs  a current  account  deficit  of 3Z
of GNP  p.a.  up to 1995,  the  external  debt indicators  do not  deteriorate
further  (see  Figure  5).  Moreover,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates.  The
real  issue,  however,  is  whether  Indonesia  can  obtain  financing  to  run  a
current  account  deficit  of 3%  of GNP.
If  assumptions  concerning  terms  of trade  and  world  demand  do  not
materialize  as expected,  then  further  external  adjustment  will  be necessary.
Figure  6 shows  the  extent  of real  exchange  rate  depreciation  necessary  to
achieve  the  targeted  current  account  and  external  debt  indicators  if external
factors  deteriorate. In  one  scenario  world  income  growth  slows  down  to only
2% p.a.  as against  3%  p.a.  in the  base  case.  In  the  second  scenario  there  is
no improvement  in the  terms  of trade  after  1988. In both  cases  the  required- 45 -
real  exchange  rate  adjustment  is  of the  order  of about  20Z  between  1988  and
1995. This  of course  has implications  for  real  wage  growth. However,  failure
to  bring  about  this  adjustment  will  reduce  growth,  because  the  external
adjustment  will  be forced  by the  external  financing  constraint  which  in turn
will reduce  import  capacity  and  growth.- 46  -
V.  The  Current  Account  and  Growth: The  Role  of  Fiscal  Policy
In the  previous  section  we looked  at the  trade-off  between  the  real
exchange  rate  and  the  rate  of debt  accumulation  or the  current  account
deficit. For  a given  rate  of world  income  growth,  domestic  output  growth  and
the  terms  of trade  (price  of oil)  a higher  current  account  deficit  allows  a
country  to  maintain  a  higher  or more  appreciated  real  exchange  rate.  In
Figure  3, it implied  a  higher  real  wage  rate. Thus,  one  aspect  of exchange
rate  depreciation  that  policymakers  worry  about  is  its  impact  on real  wages.
Depreciation  in the  real  exchange  rate  implies  a cut  in the  real  wage rate,
which  is  one  element  contributing  to the  reduction  in domestic  conaumption
that is  necessary  to  bring  about  the  external  adjustment  w-.thout  sacrificing
growth.
There  are  limits  to  real  exchange  rate  and  real  wage  adjustment  that
can  be sustained  in  practice. Current  consumption  can  only  be cut  so far  and
no further  without  threatening  social  and  economic  stability. If the  real
exchange  rate,  and  consequently  the  real  wage  rate,  cannot  be cut  any  further,
the  trade-off  between  debt  accumulation  and  growth  emerges  strongly.
Reduction  in foreign  savings  now  requires  cuts  in the  investment  rate  which  in
turn  affect  future  growth.  15/  This  can  be  avoided  only  by improvements  in
the  efficiency  of capital  use,  which  in turn  requires  deregulation,  trade
policy  improvements  and  the  like.
5/ Note  that  in  the  short  run,  a depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate  will
also  lead  to  a cut  in  private  investment  and  growth. This  is  verified
empirically  for  Indonesia  by Equation  6,  where  the  cost  of imported  inputs
has  a negative  effect  on private  investment.- 47 -
Appropriate  Fiscal  Policy:
In  an economy  with  an open  capital  account,  the  current  account
deficit  and the  fiscal  deficit  move  closely  together. This is  verified  for
Indonesia  in  Figure  7.  Higher  fiscal  deficit  will  either  reduce  growth  by
crowding  out  private  investment  or increase  the  current  account  deficit.
Monetary  policy  cannot  be used  to sustain  lower  domestic  interest  rates  to
stimulate  growth. Eventually  interest  rates  lower  than  foreign  interest  rates
plus  expected  devaluation  will  result  in  an outflow  of  capital. The
government  will  be forced  to  devalue. Monetary  policy  by itself,  therefore,
only  provides  the  nominal  anchor  which  determines  the  rate  of inflation  and
devaluation;  it  has  very  little  real  effect  on the  economy  if  the  exchange
rate is  adjusting  periodically.
Fiscal  policy  is the  key to  reconciliation  of growth  and  debt  within
reasonable  inflation  targets. To keep  growth  unchanged,  a reduction  in  the
current  account  will  require  a corresponding  reduction  in the  fiscal
deficit. Furthermore,  how  the  fiscal  deficit  is  cut  matters  a great  deal.
The  adjustment  path  is  different  if  lower  fiscal  deficit  comes  from  a decline
in  public  consumption  as  against  a cut  in  public  investment.
The  difference  in the  two  cases  arises  from  the  impact  of a fall  in
public  investment  on growth. With  a cut  in  public  investment,  there  is  a
reduction  in  income  growth. This leads  to  a decline  in  private  investment,
but  it  also  leads  to  a decline  in  private  savings  as consumers  try  to  maintain
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Section  III). The  fall  in  private  savings  is  greater  than  the  cut  in private
investment  and  net  private  savings  fall. This  reduces  the  impact  of the
decline  in the  fiscal  deficit  on the  current  account  deficit. Moreover,
economic  growth  is  lower  than  before.
We verify  this  empirically  with the  help  of a  simulation  model  based
on the  equations  presented  in  Section  III.  161  Cutting  the  fiscal  deficit  by
2X  of GNP,  with  the  entire  cut  coming  from  public  investment,  reduces  net
private  savings  by almost  1X  of CNP. As  a  result,  the  current  account  deficit
declines  by only  1X  of CNP. Also,  the  growth  rate  falls. A further  reduction
in the  current  account  deficit  requires  real  exchange  rate  depreciation.  A
cut  in  the  fiscal  deficit  through  a cut  in public  consumption  on the  other
hand translates  into  an equal  decline  in the  current  account  deficit,  while
private  investment,  private  consumption  and  growth  remain  unchanged.
A third  option  to  reduce  the  fiscal  deficit  is through  an increase  in
net  taxation,  or improved  resource  mobilization.  Once  again,  the  reaction  of
the  private  sector  is important. If  the  tax  increases  are  viewed  as permanent
and  lead  to a decline  in  permanent  disposable  income,  then  private  savings  do
not  decline. The  improvement  in  public  savings  due  to  greater  resource
mobilization  then  translates,  one to  one,  into  a corresponding  decline  in
foreign  savings  or the  current  account  deficit. If,  on the  other  hand,  the
resource  mobilization  effort  is  viewed  as a tempoary  reaction  to  the  fall  in
oil  prices,  with the  expectation  that  disposable  incomes  will  rise  once  oil
prices  go up,  private  savings  will  fall.
16/  This  model  is  available  from  the  authors  on request.- 50  -
Resource  Mobilization  and  Adjustment
The last  simulation  provides  the  key  to reconciliation  of  growth  and
debt  targets. The  target  non-oil  growth  rate  is  62 per  annum  with the
external  target  set  at reducing  the  current  account  from  -2.52  of  GNP in 1988
to -1X  of GNP  by 1995. A non-oil  GDP  target  of 6.0X  per  annum  implies  an
overall  CDP  and  GNP  growth  rate  of  about  5%  per  annum. In order  to achieve
the  target  growth  rate,  the  model  calculates  the  required  non-oil  investment
rate  of 20.9%  of GDP  (this  implies  an incremental  capital  output  ratio  of
about  3.5,  which  is  close  to its  current  level)  rising  from  18.82  of GDP  in
19E8.  171  The increase  is shared  equally  between  public  and  private
investment,  with  the  public  investment  rate  rising  by 12  of GNP; and  the
balance  coming  from  private  investment,  also  amounting  to  about  12  of  GNP.
The  projected  increase  in private  investment  comes  largely  from  the
accelerator  effect  of  higher  demand,  and  to a smaller  extent  from  a decline  in
real  interest  rates  (the  coefficients  are  based  on Equation  6).  World  real
interest  rates  are  projected  to  decline  by 2 percentage  points  between  1988
and  1995.  181  Given  the  open  capital  account,  this  translates  into  a
corresponding  decline  in  real  interest  rates  in  Indonesia. The  effect  of the
real  interest  rates  on private  investment  is small  in  relation  to the  effect
of  higher  demand.
How  can  Indonesia  manage  an increase  in  investment  with  a decline  in
the  current  account  deficit  (an  increase  in  the  current  account  surplus)? The
key  lies  in increased  resource  mobilization  leading  to  an increase  in  the  net
tax  rate  by  about  2.52  of  GNP.  The  decline  in  the  fiscal  deficit  amounts  to
17/  Using  constant  1979  price  data.
18/  Based  on World  Bank  projections.- 51  -
only 1.5%  of  GNP, since  the  ratio  of public  consumption  to  CNP  remains
constant  but  public  investment  increases  by  about  1%  of GNP.
The  corresponding  improvement  in  the  current  account  deficit  by 1.5%
of CNP  requires  an increase  in private  savings  by 1%  of GNP. This is  verified
by the  model  simulations.  The  increase  in private  savings  happens  despite  a
decline  in the  Singapore  real  interest  rate  by 2  percentage  points. The  key
assumption  here  is that  in  the  medium  term  the  increase  in the  tax  rate  will
be viewed  as permanent. Since  permanent  disposable  income  is a function  of
current  and  lagged  disposable  income,  the  ircrease  in the  net  tax  rate  is
permanent  over  a 7  year  projaction.  If the  increase  in  the  net  tax  rate  is,
however,  not  considered  permanent  (but  will  be reversed  as oil  prices  rise)
then  consumption  growth  will  equal  income  growth  at  6% per  annum,  as  against
only  4.5%  per  annum  projected  by the  model. Fiscal  policy  measures  for
increasing  the  net tax  rate  would  need  to be implemented  on a sustained  ba5is
in order  to  give  signal  to the  public  that  these  changes  are  permanent. Thus,
well-publicized,  sustained  improvements  in tax  administration  and  phasing  out
of budgetary  subsidies  and  liquidity  credits  can  be expected  to lower
permanent  income.
The simulation  results  also  confirm  that  the  target  current  account
deficit  is compatible  with  no further  depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate,
given  world  income  growth  of about  2.5-3.0%  p.a.  between  1988  and 1995
Domestic  inflation  (CPI  growth)  remains  low,  declining  to equal  world
inflation  with  no nominal  depreciation.  The  stable  real  exchange  rate  index
implies  that  there  are  no further  real  losses  on past  debt.- 52 -
VI.  Conclusions
To summarize,  Indonesia  has  t3  a large  extent  undergone  the  painful
macroeconomic  adjustments  in  response  to  a series  of external  shocks  since
1981,  especially  the  sharp  drop  in  oil  prices  in 1986. Non-oil  exports,
investment,  and  output  growth  have  picked  up again  and  future  prospects  appear
promising. The  adjvstment  h&s  come  about  primarily  due  to a large  and swift
real  exchange  rate  adjustment  combined  with structural  reforms  to improve
economic  efficiency.  The  adjustment  of the  reai  exchange  rate  has  not  been
costless. It led  to a loss  in Indonesia's  real  income  as the  value  of its
external  debt  increased  in  relation  to  GNP.  Real  wages  also  fell,
particularly  in the  public  sector. However,  Indonesia  is  now  back  to a
reasonable  non-inflationary  growth  path,  although  with  a sizeable  accumulated
debt.  This  paper  has  shown  that  Indonesia  can  achieve  a reduction  in its  debt
GNP  ratio  without  further  depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate,  while
maintaining  a satisfactory  pace  of growth.
The  key  to  this  reconciliation  lies  in  Indonesia's  fiscal  policy  and
improved  resource  mobilization.  This  will reduce  fiscal  deficits  and  restrain
private  consumption  to  a growth  rate  of 4.5%  per  annum  over  the  1988-94  period
(per  capita  growth  of about  2.5%  per  annum). Higher  growth  in  per  capita
consumption  will  come  at the  cost  of lower  debt/GNP  reduction.  However,  even
with  6Z growth  in  private  consumption  and  no reduction  in  the  current  account
deficit,  the  debt/GNP  ratio  will still  decline,  although  not  to the  target
level  of about  50%  of GNP.
The  open  capital  account  has  reduced  one  degree  of freedom  for  policy
through  the  interest  rate  arbitrage. Over  the  long  term,  Indonesian  interest
rates  will  need  to  be equal  to Singapore  interest  rates  plus  expected
devaluation. This  has  also  meant  that  the  fiscal  deficit  and  the  current- 53 -
account  deficit  cannot  deviate  from  each  other  over  an extended  period. But
it  has forced  the  needed  stability  in  macroeconomic  policies  that  has  allowed
Indonesia  quite  uniquely  among  the  middle-income  oil  producing  countries  to
adjust  rapidly  to oil  price  shocks  and  begin  the  next  decade  with  good
prospects  for  non-inflationary  growth  and  better  creditworthiness  indicators.
This  paper  has  used  an econometrically  estimated  macroeconomic  model
to simulate  the  degree  of adjustments  Indonesia  has  undertaken  and  then  to
look  for  the  direction  of future  policy  changes  in light  of Indonesia's
objectives  on growth,  external  debt  and inflation.  It shows  that,  as a result
of past  adjustment,  Indonesia  has the  ability  to  reduce  its  stock  of debt  and
maintain  non-inflationary  growth. For  the  future,  a sustained  strategy  to
reduce  the  fiscal  deficit,  restrain  the  growth  of  consumption  at below  the
pace  of output  growth  and  p-omote  non-oil  exports  will  be  required. The
Indonesian  experience  not  only  provides  an example  to other  oil-exporters  but
to  all  high-debt  countries. Indonesia  has  focussed  on  maintaining
creditworthiness  through  swift  policy  adjustments  aimed  at increasing  exports
and  growth. It  has  provided  a stable  and sound  macroeconomic  policy
environment  ir contrast  with  the  stop-go  reforms  in  many  high-debt  countries
with considerable  uncertainty  heightened  by continuous  debt  renegotiations.
The  gains  from  this  stable  policy  environment  in terms  of  avoiding  capital
flight,  attracting  productive  foreign  investment  and  export  diversification
probably  far  exceed  the  likely  benefits  of contentious  debt  reduction
negotiations  currently  underway. Of course,  many  of the  high  debt  countries
may  not  have  the  options  Indonesia  now  enjoys  because  of its  past  adjustment
efforts.- 54 -
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